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In this study, we investigated discrimination against women within
the Brazilian labor market using ﬁrm-level data. We based on employer
discrimination model proposed by Becker and considering the propor-
tion of female employees as a proxy for the extent of discrimination.
Estimating the proﬁt eﬃciency of ﬁrms using data envelopment analy-
sis, and regressing it on the proportion of female employees and other
ﬁrm characteristics, we found that the proportion of female employ-
ees has positive eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁt eﬃciency. Our ﬁnding provided
strong evidence of the existence of discrimination against female em-
ployees within the Brazilian labor market.
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11 Introduction
It is well known that income distribution in Brazil is extremely unequal.
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2006), the
top 20% of the Brazilian population earns an income that is 26 times larger
than that earned by the bottom 20%, yielding a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.58. De-
spite this fact, many argue that discrimination does not exist in Brazil, par-
ticularly discrimination against racial minorities. However, recent research
suggests that there indeed exists discrimination against racial minorities and
women in Brazil.
Discrimination within any society can lead to the distortion of resource
allocation, and may discourage economic growth. No less an authority than
the World Bank (2001) claims that gender inequality disadvantages not only
women but also the entire society, while hidering economic development,
particularly in low-income countries.
Discrimination against women takes on numerous forms and exists in
all sectors of society, including the labor market. Regarding the causes of
discrimination, inequality of educational opportunity is considered the root
cause of many other forms of inequality. In most countries, especially in de-
veloping countries, limitations on women’s access to education and inequal-
ity in education are the root causes of many aspects of gender inequality.
Despite this fact, the educational attainment of women in Brazil and
several other Latin American countries is currently higher than that of men.
In one study, the Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais
An´ ısio Teixeira/Minist´ erio da Edu¸ cac˜ ao (Inep/MEC, 2004) found that in
22001, Brazilian women had attained an average of 6.2 years of education
whereas Brazilian men had attained an average of 5.9 years. Despite womenʟ
s higher educational attainment, discrimination exists within the Brazilian
labor market, a discrepancy that we investigated in this study.
The majority of the previous research on gender discrimination in Brazil
estimated the wage functions for men and women separately and considered
the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients as a measurement of discrimination.
However, these estimated coeﬃcients reﬂected the bias that inevitably arises
due to the existence of unobservable factors that aﬀect productivity. If such
unobservable factors systematically diﬀer according to gender, the variable
of “discrimination” as measured by this method would be little more than
a measure of the gender diﬀerence in productivity. To address this concern,
we employed an approach that diﬀered from that of previous research to
determine whether discrimination exists within the Brazilian labor market.
Speciﬁcally, we assumed that if female employees are paid less than their pro-
ductivity warrants due to the existence of discrimination, ﬁrms can increase
their proﬁtability by employing more women. Based on this assumption,
we employed data envelopment analysis (DEA) to analyze the relationship
between the proportion of female employees employed by a ﬁrm and the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt eﬃciency to test for the existence of discrimination.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature regarding gender discrimination while section 3 discusses the
theoretical background. Next, section 4 describes the empirical strategy
that we employed, and section 5 describes the data and the variables that
3we examined and our justiﬁcation for doing so. Section 6 discusses our
results before closing the study with concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
Much research into male-female wage discrimination has been conducted
using the human capital approach. According to this approach, discrimina-
tion against women is considered to exist whenever the relative wage of men
exceeds the relative wage that would have prevailed if men and women had
been paid equally according to the same criteria (Oaxaca, 1973), with the
market discrimination coeﬃcient being deﬁned as the percentage wage dif-
ferential between two types of perfectly substitutable labor (Becker, 1971).
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) developed a simple means of decompos-
ing wage diﬀerentials into the proportion of the diﬀerential arising from
diﬀerences in productivity and discrimination. To perform Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition, suppose that the wages of each male and female employee
are determined by the following human capital earnings equations:
lnwm = Xmm + um; (1)
lnwf = Xff + uf: (2)
Here, w denotes the wage, X denotes the vector of the labor characteristics
aﬀecting productivity,  the vector of the coeﬃcients of earnings functions,
and u the error term. The superscriptsʠ m ʡandʠ f ʡdenote male and
female, respectively. By estimating m and f by the ordinal least square
4using individual-level data and deﬁning the estimated vectors of coeﬃcients
as ˆ m and ˆ f, we can decompose the wage diﬀerentials as follows:
lnwm − lnwf = ¯ Xmˆ m − ¯ Xf ˆ f = ( ¯ Xm − ¯ Xf)ˆ m + ¯ Xf(ˆ m − ˆ f): (3)
Here, lnw denotes the average of the log wage and ¯ X the vector of the aver-
age value of the characteristics aﬀecting productivity. The ﬁrst term on the
right side of the equation can be interpreted as the wage diﬀerential because
of the diﬀerence in productivity between men and women and the second
term as the wage diﬀerential not explained by the diﬀerence in productivity,
i.e., discrimination.
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition has been employed in many studies on
discrimination1. Focusing on the Brazilian labor market, Lovell (2000) es-
timated the monthly wages of white, black, and mixed-race women and
men working in the states of S˜ ao Paulo and Bahia using a sample of 1991
census data. She found that discrimination did indeed exist in Brazilian
labor market, with women and blacks working in S˜ ao Paulo experiencing
greater discrimination compared to their counterparts in Bahia, but that
occupational and wage distributions were more equal in S˜ ao Paulo. Us-
ing data collected by the National Household Survey (PNAD) of 1992 and
1998, Loureiro, Carneiro and Sachsida (2004) also tested for the existence
of racial and gender discrimination, accounting for sample selection bias by
simultaneously estimating the labor market participation function and the
wage function following Heckman (1979). Even after controlling for sam-
5ple selection bias, they found that more than 50% of the male-female wage
diﬀerential could be attributed to discrimination, with the discrimination
diﬀerential being larger in urban areas.
In this study, we faced several limitations in using Blinder-Oaxaca de-
composition to measure discrimination. First, we were unable to distinguish
between discrimination due to unequal pay for equal work and discrimina-
tion due to unequal occupational distribution, i.e., occupational segregation.
Several researchers have addressed this challenge. When Birdsall and Fox
(1985) analyzed the male-female wage diﬀerential of primary and secondary
Brazilian school teachers, they found evidence of only a low level of occupa-
tional segregation, and that the opportunity to be promoted to a secondary
school position, which paid a higher salary than did a primary school posi-
tion, was relatively equal for men and women when the diﬀerences between
the observable characteristics of male and female teachers were taken into
account. When Nomura (2010) followed Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980)
by including more comprehensive occupations in his analysis, he found that
wage discrimination for the same position was greater than was occupational
segregation; this was consistent with the ﬁndings of Birdsall and Fox (1985).
A second limitation that we faced was the possible existence of unob-
servable factors aﬀecting productivity that systematically diﬀer according
to gender. Although Griliches (1977) and Card (1999) demonstrated that
the impact of unobservable factors on wages was limited, the measurements
of discrimination using wage regression could have led them to overestimate
the extent of discrimination. To address this problem, Hellerstein, Neumark
6and Troske (2002) tested the discrimination hypothesis of Becker (1971)
more directly by using a “market testing” approach. Analyzing U.S. ﬁrm-
level data, they found a positive correlation between proﬁtability and the
proportion of female workers in the workforce. Since ﬁrms can earn more
proﬁt by employing more women when women are paid less than their pro-
ductivity warrants, Hellerstein et al. (2002) considered the existence of this
correlation as evidence of gender discrimination. When Kawaguchi (2007)
performed market testing using Japanese ﬁrm-level panel data while main-
taining a strong focus on unobservable productivity shocks, he identiﬁed
the existence of a positive correlation between female employment and ﬁrm
proﬁtability within the Japanese labor market. Since the costs of gender
discrimination and inequality are larger in less developed countries (World
Bank, 2001), market testing should be performed using data from devel-
oping countries as well. Nevertheless, no study before the present one has
performed market testing using Brazilian ﬁrm-level data.
This study, therefore, addressed a research gap by examining the rela-
tionship between the proportion of female employees and ﬁrm proﬁt eﬃ-
ciency using Brazilian ﬁrm-level data to test the discrimination hypothesis
proposed by Becker (1971). Although our research generally accords with
that of Hellerstein et al. (2002) and Kawaguchi (2007), we deﬁned proﬁt
eﬃciency as the distance from an actual point to the frontier identiﬁed by
non-parametric estimation, i.e., the DEA, and focused on estimating loss in
eﬃciency due to gender discrimination.
73 Theoritical Background
We based our method on the employer discrimination model proposed by
Becker (1971), who assumed that an employer working for a ﬁrm prefers to
maximize his or her utility instead of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt taking wage as given.
Consider that a ﬁrm can produce an output Y using the inputs of male
labor M, female labor F, and other inputs OI = (OI1;:::;OIJ 2). The
utility function of an employer who prefers not to employ female workers
and thus pays a psychic cost when forced to employ women can be deﬁned
as






where p is the price of the output; wM and wF are the wages of male
and female employees, respectively; wOI is the price of other inputs; and
d is the discrimination coeﬃcient representing the extent of the employer’s
discrimination against women, which we assumed to vary across ﬁrms.








2 = wF; (6)
where MRPM and MRPF are the marginal revenue products of male and
female workers, respectively. The marginal revenue product of female work-
ers is set above their wages while that of male workers is set below their
8wage. Thus, only ﬁrms whose employers do not engage in discrimination
(d = 0) can maximize their proﬁt, and the proﬁt decreases with an increase
in d.
To investigate the existence of discrimination against female workers in
the Brazilian labor market, we employed a proﬁt eﬃciency model following
F¨ are and Grosskopf (2004). The proﬁt eﬃciency model begins with deﬁning
the notation of technology set T as
T = {(X;Y ) : X can produce Y }; (7)
where X = (M;F;OI) ∈ ℜJ
+ is a nonnegative vector of inputs including
labor, Y ∈ ℜG
+ is a non-negative vector of outputs. Given output prices
p ∈ ℜG
+ and input prices w = (wM;wF;wOI) ∈ ℜJ
+, the maximum proﬁt for
a ﬁrm can be deﬁned as
Π(p;w) = sup{pY − wX : (X;Y ) ∈ T}: (8)
The boundary of T is referred to as the technology or the production
frontier. The distance from the actual point of each ﬁrm in the production
set T to the frontier of T, which is considered as its level of ineﬃciency,
is determined by the ﬁrm’s environmental variables Z = (Z1;:::;ZQ) ∈
ℜ
Q
+. Depending on their speciﬁc environment, ﬁrms may operate along the
production frontier or at a point within the interior of their production
frontier, with the former being considered as eﬃcient ﬁrms and the latter
9being considered as ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
The Nerlovian proﬁt eﬃciency is deﬁned as
PE(p;w;Y;X;gY ;gX) =
Π(p;w) − (pY − wX)
pgY + wgX
; (9)
where gX and gY are the directional vectors in which eﬃciency is evaluated.
This type of proﬁt eﬃciency is often regarded as aggregate eﬃciency as it
encompasses two types of eﬃciency: technical and allocative.
Under the condition that the output prices, wages, and eﬃciency direc-
tional vectors are identical across ﬁrms, the proﬁt eﬃciency of ﬁrms can be
estimated by examining their input and output values. Recognizing that
the proﬁt eﬃciency of ﬁrms is determined by their speciﬁc characteristics,
we estimated the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics on eﬃciency. Among
the many factors that likely impact proﬁt eﬃciency, we examined the impact
of discrimination against women using the proportion of female employees
as a proxy for the extent to which an employer engages in discrimination.
Since seeking to fulﬁll the goal of proﬁt maximization is a necessary condi-
tion for achieving proﬁt eﬃciency, only ﬁrms whose hiring managers do not
engage in discrimination against women can attain proﬁt eﬃciency. That
is, assuming the existence of discrimination, a ﬁrm with a high proportion
of female workers will have a higher level of proﬁt eﬃciency than will a ﬁrm
employing a low proportion of female workers.
104 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical procedure follows Simar and Wilson (2000) and Zelenyuk and
Zheka (2006) and cosists of two stages . In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate the
proﬁt eﬃciency of each ﬁrm by using DEA. Then in the second stage, we
analyze the determinant of ﬁrm eﬃciency by regressing the proﬁt eﬃciency
obtained in the ﬁrst stage on ﬁrm’s characteristics.
4.1 Proﬁt Eﬃciency Estimation
One challenge of researching proﬁt eﬃciency is that data regarding output
and input prices are usually unavailable as ﬁnancial information (e.g., labor,
material, and energy costs) is typically reported at the ﬁrm level. To over-
come this challenge, we employed an alternative DEA approach to measure
proﬁt eﬃciency using ﬁnancial information. Speciﬁcally, we used input and
output data aggregated with price data in the traditional DEA model to
measure a proxy for proﬁt eﬃciency that encompassed both technical and
allocative eﬃciency2.
To measure such proﬁt eﬃciency, we employ the cost and revenue-based





   
 (xi;yi) ∈ T
}
; (10)
where xi = wXi is a vector of aggregated inputs and yi = pYi is a vector of
aggregated outputs. When PEi = 1, the ﬁrm is considered to be eﬃcient.
And when PEi > 1, the ﬁrm is considered to be ineﬃcient, and the reciprocal
11of PEi, 0 < (1=PEi) ≤ 1, represents the percent level of the eﬃciency of
ﬁrm i relative to the production frontier.
Since the true technology sets cannot be directly observed, we employed
the most common DEA procedure to estimate the best-practice frontier from





   










ji j = 1;:::;J;
n ∑
i=1
qi = 1; qi ≥ 0; i = 1;:::;n;
}
; (11)
where ˆ T is the DEA estimate of the true production frontier of T and qi are
the intensity variables over which optimization is made. By employing this
procedure, the DEA estimate of individual eﬃciency at any point (xi;yi)
can be obtained by replacing T with ˆ T in (10) and solving the following
linear programming problem:
  PEi = max
;q1;:::;qn
{
|(xi;yi) ∈ ˆ T
}
: (12)
It is clear that ˆ T ⊆ T, therfore   PEi is downward-biased estimator of
PEi. To address this problem, we employ a bootstrap DEA procedure de-
veloped by several DEA researchers (e.g. Simar and Wilson, 2000; Henderson
and Zelenyuk, 2007; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2007).
124.2 Determinants of proﬁt eﬃciency
To investigate the dependency of ﬁrm eﬃciency on ﬁrm environmental vari-
ables, we regressed the proﬁt eﬃciency gained from the ﬁrst stage on several
environmental variables. The determinant model of eﬃciency is expressed
as
  PEi = Zi + "i
= 0 + 1Z1i + 2Z2i + 3Z3i + 4Z4i + indi5 + vi + "i; (13)
where   PEi is the proﬁt eﬃciency of ith ﬁrm as deﬁned in (12);  is a vector
of the parameters that are being estimated; Zi is a vector of ﬁrm environ-
mental variables that may aﬀect the eﬃciency of the ith ﬁrm. Z1i is the
proportion of female employees compared to total employees. If workplace
discrimination against women existed, then employing a higher proportion
of female workers would result in higher proﬁt eﬃciency. Thus, a negative
1 would lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no gender dis-
crimination3. The variable of ﬁrm age, Z2i, may or may not have positive
eﬀect on ﬁrm performance; whereas ﬁrms tend to perform functions more
eﬀectively, which increases performance, with the experience that only can
be acquired with increased age, their level of bureaucracy (organizational
rigidity), which leads to increases in variable costs and overhead expenses,
and thereby decreases in performance, also increases with age. Z3i is an
output variable (the logarithm of total sales) that captures the scale eﬀect.
To account for the opportunity cost of capital, we included the ratio of
13ﬁxed assets to total sales, Z4i, in the equation. We also introduced industry
dummies, indi, to control industrial heterogeneity; a proxy, vi, to capture
productivity or demand shocks; the idiosyncratic error term, "i. With re-
gard to the proxy, vi, we employed the approach used by Kawaguchi (2007)
to control productivity or demand shocks, which he based on consideration
of two types of proxy variables: one is investment following Olley and Pakes
(1996) and the other is intermediate inputs following Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003).
Assuming that current positive productivity shocks will aﬀect a ﬁrm’s
future level of investment, Olley and Pakes (1996) suggested that a ﬁrm’s
level of investment can be used as a proxy of unobserved productivity shocks
in the production function. When, according to their suggestion, the in-
vestment function is expressed as Ii = I(ki;vi) and it is assumed that
@Ii=@vi > 0, where Ii is the amount of investment, ki is the capital stock,
and vi is the productivity shock, productivity shock can be expressed as an
inverse function of investment and capital. Following Kawaguchi (2007), we
speciﬁed the function as












At this point, we omitted from our sample those ﬁrms whose micro-level
data indicated that they made no investments. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
suggested using intermediate inputs as a proxy variable for productivity
shocks to avoid ommiting ﬁrms without reporting investments, explaining
14that if the demand function of intermediate inputs is expressed as mi =
m(vi;ki), productivity shock can be expressed as a function of intermediate
inputs and capital stock. Again following Kawaguchi (2007), we speciﬁed
the function as























where Ci is the total production cost, mi is the cost of intermediate inputs,
and ki=yi is the asset-to-sales ratio.
Traditional two-stage DEA models typically employ OLS or the Tobit
model to estimate (13). However, Simar and Wilson (2007) argued that
standard DEA eﬃciency estimates are inappropriate because they do not
provide a coherent description of a data-generating process and because
they are serially correlated. Recognizing that the DEA estimation obtained
using the traditional two-stage model is inconsistent in the second-stage
regression, they proposed the use of a two-stage bootstrap DEA approach
to obtain a consistent result. In this study, our use of one of their bootstrap
procedures, Algorithm 24, allowed us to replace the unobserved PEi by
its bias-corrected estimate,   PE
bc
i . In this procedure,   PE
bc
i is deﬁned to be
equal or greater than one, the distribution of "i is restricted by the condition
"i ≥ 1 − Zi, and the eﬃciency determinant model can be written as
  PE
bc
i ≈ Zi + "i; (16)
15where
"i ∼ N(0;2
"); such that "i ≥ 1 − Zi: (17)
5 Data
We obtained the data that we analyzed in this paper from the World Bank
Investment Climate Survey, which used standardized survey instruments
and a uniform sampling methodology to analyze ﬁrm performance and the
business environment of developing countries5. To conduct a survey on
Brazil, the Investment Climate Survey Group of the World Bank randomly
sampled 1,641 ﬁrms from nine manufacturing industries in 13 geographic
regions in the reference year 2002. After excluding observations with missing
values, our working sample consisted of 1,456 ﬁrms.
We used the variable of the value of total sales as the output and the
variables of labor, material, and energy costs as the inputs to estimate the
proﬁt eﬃciency score of each ﬁrm using a bootstrap DEA procedure. We
deﬁned the labor cost as the total annual cost of paying wages, salaries,
bonuses, and social security payments to employees; material cost as the to-
tal annual cost of raw materials and intermediate goods used in production;
and energy cost as the total annual costs of fuel and electricity.
Such measurement of output and inputs enables us to extend the inter-
pretation of technology to encompass more than simply engineering capacity,
and gives us some justiﬁcation for pooling data over sub-industries to mea-
16sure eﬃciency of each ﬁrm using DEA (Zelenyuk and Zheka, 2006, p148).
A beneﬁt of pooling data over sub-industry was that it allowed us to
increase the sample size, which would prove to be very important in obtain-
ing an estimation for the eﬃciency determinant model in the second stage
of this study6. Recognizing this beneﬁt, we pooled all the data collected
from ﬁrms within various sub-industries in manufacturing and estimated
the meta-frontier of the entire manufacturing industry.
The descriptive statistics of our dataset are presented in Table 1.
[Table 1 is inserted here]
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Estimation of proﬁt eﬃciency
In the ﬁrst stage, we obtained the proﬁt eﬃciency score of each ﬁrm by solv-
ing the linear programming problem presented in Equation (10). When we
then used the kernel density estimator to obtain the density of the eﬃciency
scores in order to identify any outliers, our results suggested the existence
of several outliers in the sample. Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006) suggested that
there are mainly three reasons can give rise to eﬃciency outliers. First, ﬁrms
with eﬃciency outliers follow a diﬀerent distribution of eﬃciency; namely,
these ﬁrms operate under a diﬀerent production frontier. Second, although
all ﬁrms follow the same distribution pattern, experiencing external shocks
(e.g., strikes or unexpected incidents) cause some ﬁrms to appear far within
the tail of the distribution. Finally, when ﬁrms commit errors when record-
17ing data regarding their output or input variables, such as by inserting extra
digits, their eﬃciency scores will be incorrect. We believe that outliers may
have arisen in our sample due to the last two factors, as the output and in-
put data for several ﬁrms appeared unusual. As these outliers could disturb
our estimation of the frontier, we omitted 2.5% of the ﬁrms on both sides of
the eﬃciency density distribution (5% of ﬁrms in total) from our sample.
We recognized that although our revised sample contained a distribution
of eﬃciency scores that presented us with desirable properties for analysis,
it may not have been representative of the original sample. Fortunately, we
found that we could use the Simar-Zelenyuk adaption of the Li Test (Simar
and Zelenyuk, 2007) to address this problem. We obtained a bootstrap P-
value of 0.929 using the Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted Li Test and, thus, could
not reject the hypothesis that the distributions of the original and revised
samples are equal. Therefore, we used the revised sample in our two-step
estimations.
Examining the bootstrap bias-corrected eﬃciency scores that we had
obtained during the ﬁrst stage, we found that the aggregate of the eﬃciencies
obtained by our bootstrap bias-corrected estimation was larger than that
obtained by our original DEA estimation. Our result is thus consistent with
the bootstrap DEA literature, which asserts that the original DEA estimates
are biased downward.
186.2 Determinants of eﬃciency
In the second stage, we estimated the eﬃciency determinant model. We
obtain parameters and the conﬁdence intervals from performing 2,000 repli-
cations of the bootstrapping procedures. Speciﬁcally, we regressed the bias-
corrected eﬃciency scores that we obtained from the ﬁrst stage on ﬁrm envi-
ronmental variables and industry dummies using Algorithm 2 of Simar and
Wilson (2007) and performed 2,000 replications of the bootstrapping proce-
dures to both ensure bias correction and obtain the conﬁdence intervals of
the estimated coeﬃcients. Our results are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 is inserted here]
As shown in Column (1), which reports the basic estimation result, the
coeﬃcient of the proportion of female employees is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level according to the bootstrap conﬁdence intervals,
as we had expected. The negative coeﬃcient of the proportion of female
employees suggests that a proportion of female workers has a positive eﬀect
on ﬁrm proﬁt eﬃciency, and thus provides strong evidence for the existence
of gender discrimination.
In creating Column (2), which reports the result of the estimation using
Olley and Pakes (1996) proxy variables for productivity or demand shocks,
we omitted several observations from the sample shown in Column (1) be-
cause of the unavailability of investment data. As can be observed, the
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, and suggest that investment cap-
tures productivity or demand shocks. Nevertheless, the coeﬃcient of the
proportion of female employees did not change signiﬁcantly after the proxy
19variables were included in the model.
As shown in Column (3), which reports the result of the estimation
including Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) proxy variables for productivity or
demand shocks, the coeﬃcients are also statistically signiﬁcant. However,
when we used intermediate inputs as proxies, we found that the coeﬃcient
of the proportion of female employees increased, a result that was contrary
to our expectation that the coeﬃcient of the proportion of female employees
would be upward biased7.
Our ﬁnding that the logarithm of total sales has positive eﬀect on ﬁrm
proﬁt eﬃciency in all speciﬁcations suggests that larger ﬁrms tend to be more
eﬃcient than smaller ﬁrms within the Brazilian manufacturing industry. In
contrast, we found that the ratio of ﬁxed assets to total sales has negative
eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁt eﬃciency in all speciﬁcations. Somewhat surprisingly,
we also found that ﬁrm age has negative eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁt eﬃciency in
all speciﬁcations. As discussed in Section 3, ﬁrm age may have positive
eﬀect on ﬁrm performance (greater age brings with it greater knowledge) or
negative eﬀect (greater age brings with it greater organizational rigidity).
We, therefore, interpreted our ﬁnding as the latter factor having a greater
impact on ﬁrm performance than the former factor does.
6.3 Proportion of female employees and total cost
If female employees are paid a lower wage than male employees due to the
existence of workplace discrimination, a ﬁrm can achieve higher allocative
eﬃciency by substituting male labor with female labor to decrease the labor
20cost. As discussed in the previous section, the proﬁt (aggregate) eﬃciency of
a ﬁrm can be decomposed into two forms of eﬃciency: technical and alloca-
tive. However, performing this decomposition empirically requires access to
data regarding the prices of output and input that are typically unavailable.
Although it is diﬃcult to decompose the proﬁt eﬃciency into technical and
allocative eﬃciency, it is worth to conﬁrm whether higher female proportion
leads to lower labor cost.
Following Kawaguchi (2007), we employed a total wage function to test
the hypothesis that employing a higher proportion of female employees leads




2 log(output)i + 
3indi + ui; (18)
where wagei is the total labor cost of a ﬁrm and Z1i is the proportion of
female employees to total employees. If female employees are paid a lower
wage than male employees due to the existence of workplace discrimina-
tion, the proportion of female employees would have negative eﬀect on labor
cost, given the same level of output. We estimated (18) by the ordinary
least square and tested the null hypothesis 
1 = 0 against the alternative
hypothesis 
1 < 0.
[Table 3 is inserted here]
As shown in Table 3, we found the coeﬃcient of the proportion of fe-
male employees to be negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, suggesting
that employing a higher proportion of female employees within the Brazil-
21ian manufacturing industry leads to a lower labor cost. Therefore, we can
conclude that employing a higher proportion of female employees leads to
higher allocative eﬃciency.
6.4 Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we also regressed proﬁtability on the proportion of
female employees following Hellerstein et al. (2002) and Kawaguchi (2007).
In parallel with (12), the speciﬁcation is as follows:
profitabilityi = 0 +1Z1i +2Z2i +3Z3i +4Z4i +indi5 +vi +"i; (19)
where profitabilityi is deﬁned as the ratio of total proﬁt (total sales - total
cost) to total sales and the explanatory variables on the right side are deﬁned
in the same manner as they are in (12).
The results of regression by the ordinal least square are reported in
Table 4, with the results of the basic estimation for (19) in Column (1) and
the results of the estimation using Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) proxy variables for demand and productivity shocks in
Columns (2) and (3), respectively.
[Table 4 is inserted here]
As shown in Column(1), we found that the proportion of female employ-
ees has positive eﬀect on proﬁtability, which supports the results that we
obtained from the proﬁt eﬃciency model and provides further evidence that
gender discrimination exists within the Brazilian labor market.
22As shown in Column (2), which reports the results when Olley and Pakes
(1996) proxy variables are included in the regression, the coeﬃcient of the
proportion of female employees becomes more signiﬁcant when these vari-
ables are included, although the coeﬃcients of the proxy variables are in-
signiﬁcant. As shown in Column (3), which reports the result of the estima-
tion including Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) proxy variables for demand and
productivity shocks, the coeﬃcients of the proxy variables are signiﬁcant.
Particularly noteworthy is that adding the proxy variables led the coeﬃcient
of the proportion of female employees to decrease, a result that contrasts
with that obtained when using proﬁt eﬃciency determinant models.
Consistent with the results obtained using proﬁt eﬃciency determinant
models, we found that ﬁrm size has positive eﬀect on proﬁtability in all
speciﬁcations. In contrast with the results obtained using proﬁt eﬃciency
determinant models, we found that ﬁrm age and the ratio of ﬁxed assets to
total sales have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁt ratio.
As each speciﬁcation resulted in diﬀerent conclusions, our results are not
very reliable, one reason for which may be the quality of the data, as the
survey data that we used contained missing values or outliers. Although
we did our best to address these problems, we acknowledge the possibility
that our use of these data skewed our estimations. Despite this caveat, we
found that the proportion of female employees has positive eﬀect on proﬁt
eﬃciency and proﬁtability, regardless of the method or speciﬁcation used to
examine this eﬀect, a ﬁnding that provides strong evidence of the existence
of gender discrimination within the Brazilian labor market.
237 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated gender discrimination in Brazil by employing
a two-stage bootstrap DEA approach to proﬁt eﬃciency, and testing the im-
plication of the employer discrimination model proposed by Becker (1971).
Our results indicate that the proportion of female employees has positive
eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁt eﬃciency, a ﬁnding that we found to be robust when
we used several diﬀerent methods and speciﬁcations. We consider this ﬁnd-
ing to be strong evidence of the existence of discrimination against female
employees within the Brazilian labor market. Although we were unable to
decompose aggregated proﬁt eﬃciency into its components of technical ef-
ﬁciency and allocative eﬃciency, the results of our estimation of the total
wage function indicate that a ﬁrm employing a high proportion of female
workers incurs a lower labor cost while producing the same level of out-
put compared with a ﬁrm employing a low proportion of female employees.
Our ﬁndings support those reported in previous studies (e.g, Lovell, 2000;
Loureiro et al., 2004; Nomura, 2010) that estimated workplace gender dis-
crimination using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and that assumed that the
male-female wage diﬀerential which could not be explained by diﬀerences in
individual characteristics was due to discrimination.
Brazil has recently experienced very rapid economic growth, especially
after the implementation of the Real Plan in 1994. Nevertheless, income
inequality remains a serious concern, one that has been attributed to dis-
crimination against women and racial minorities. As such, discrimination
impedes fair competition and confounds equality of opportunities and out-
24comes, it likely distorts resource allocation and hinders economic growth,
negatively impacting not only women and discriminatory employers but also
Brazilian society as a whole.
The results of our analysis indicate that employer discrimination against
female employees leads to a loss of proﬁt eﬃciency. A serious concern re-
maining is to estimate the loss. We plan to address this concern, as well as
identify the ultimate bearers of discrimination, in our future research.
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28Notes
1See Altonji and Blank (1999) for more details.
2F¨ are and Grosskopf (1985), F¨ are and Zelenyuk (2002), and F¨ are and
Grosskopf (2004) have theoretically discussed aggregated inputs or out-
puts in DEA model. There are also many empirical studies using ag-
gregated inputs and outputs in DEA formulation. See the discussion in
Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006).
3Note that a larger eﬃciency score means larger ineﬃciency. Therefore,
the negative coeﬃcients in the regressions mean the positive eﬀect on
ﬁrm eﬃciency.
4See Simar and Wilson (2007, p.42) for details.
5For more information about the survey, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org
6Simar and Wilson (2007) argued that maximum likelihood often pro-
duces biased estimates in small samples. Therefore, a large sample size
is preferred in the two-stage bootstrap DEA estimation.
7The same result is obtained in Kawaguchi (2007). Nevertheless, it is
diﬃcult to interpret these results.
29Table 1
Discriptive statistics of study dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Profit ratio (%) 28.62 22.51 -65.20 93.23
Log(wage) 9.02 0.92 4.80 15.45
Output variable (in thousands of R$):
Total sales 24700.00 134000.00 33.95 3670000.00
Input variables (in thousands of R$):
Labor cost 2490.78 10700.00 8.81 189000.00
Material cost 12300.00 73200.00 2.28 2110000.00
Energy cost 561.54 3941.27 0.01 90000.00
Explanatory variables:
Proportion of female employees 0.37 0.30 0.36 0.30
Firm age 19.72 17.34 22.28 16.97
Fixed assets/Total sales 0.44 4.88 0.83 5.94
Investment/Fixed assets 0.74 5.27 1.96 21.26
Material cost/Total cost 0.62 0.21 0.58 0.19
Number of firms 1456
Note: The number of observations of Investment/Fixed assets was 1338.Table 2
Estimation results of the efficiency determinant model 
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 12.960 12.891 13.994
Proportion of female employees -0.211 -0.211 -0.318
Firm age 0.017 0.015 0.007
Log(output) -0.634 -0.629 -0.387








Industry dummies yes yes yes
σ 1.599 1.603 1.439
Number of observations 1456 1338 1456
Notes:
1. Estimation according to Algorithm 2 of Simar and Wilson
(2007), with 2000 bootstrap replication to correct bias and obtain
confidence intervals of the estimated regression coefficients.
2. The dependent variable was the bootstrap bias-corrected DEA
estimate of the efficiency score.
3. All the coefficients were  statistically significant at 0.01
significance levels, according to the bootstrap confidence intervals.Table 3
Determinantion of total wage
Constant 4.952***
(0.181)







Number of observations 1456
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
2. ***,**,* represent 1%, 5%, 10% significance respectively.Table 4




Proportion of female employee 5.286* 6.523** 4.264
(3.139) (3.320) (3.124)
Firm age 0.026 0.049 0.019
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
Log(output) 3.890*** 3.747*** 4.346***
(0.339) (0.355) (0.385)














Industry dummies yes yes yes
R
2 0.108 0.107 0.124
Number of observations 1456 1338 1456
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
2. ***,**,* represent 1%, 5%, 10% significance respectively.